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CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS UNDER THE
FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST LAW.
The Federal Anti-Trust Law I is confined in its sphere of
operation to interstate and foreign trade or commerce. It
makes two classes of acts illegal-first, contracts, combinations
or conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce; and second,
monopolies of or attempts to monopolize any part of such trade
or commerce. The word "trade" adds nothing to the scope of
the act, as the word "commerce" embraces everything which is
within the constitutional power of Congress. Four remedies
are provided for violations of the act-first, they are made
crimes; second, they may be enjoined by proceedings in equity;
third, property in transit which is the subject of such a con-
tract, combination or conspiracy may be forfeited; and fourth,
persons injured may recover treble damages, together with costs
and a reasonable attorney's fee. Prior to the present year this
law has been three times before the United States Supreme
Court for consideration and two constitutional questions arising
under it have been settled.
In the Sugar Trust case, 2 in 1894, the court held in effect
that many or most of the so-called "trusts" at which the act was
aimed were not within its scope, because Congress has no power
under the Constitution to regulate agricultural or manufacturing
industries, and that while combinations in such industries might
have a great indirect effect upon commerce, that was not suffi-
cient foundation for Congressional interference. In the recent
case of the Cast Iron Pipe Trust,3 the ruling was construed by
1 Act of July 2, i89o, c. 647.
2 U. S. v. E. C. Knight Co., x56 U. S. x.
S U. S. v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. et at., 78 Fed. Rep, 72, reversed
Feb. 14, z898, by Mr. Justice Harlan,and Taft and Lurton,JJ.,S5 Fed. Rep. 271.
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the court of first instance to mean in effect that a combination of
manufacturers could not be attacked under this act at all; but
the appellate court held that when such a combination adopts
methods which directly restrain commerce, it may be and is
reached by the Congressional prohibitions.
The Debs case, 4 in 1895, involved consideration of the Anti-
Trust Law, but was decided by the Supreme Court wholly upon
other grounds.
The Trans-Missouri case, 5 in 1897, finally established the
right of a court of equity to prevent violations of this act by its
injunction. On petition for rehearing a very strong protest was
made against this ruling upon constitutional ground, eminent
counsel 6 claiming that this was an invasion of the right of trial
by jury, since the offenses thus punished were criminal in their
nature. After long consideration the court denied this petition
without further opinion. Substantially the same question had
been fully argued and decided in the Debs case.7
The main question argued in the Trans-Missouri case as to
the interpretation of this act was whether its first clause should
be given a more literal meaning, prohibiting "every" contract,
combination or conspiracy whose main object was in restraint of
trade, or whether the word "unreasonable" should be interlined
by the court, so that the statute should prohibit only such
restraints as should seem to the court or jury unreasonable. In
the latter event the clause would have raised a new constitu-
tional question, for it is very doubtful whether merely "unrea-
sonable" actions can be declared penal. 8 The word is not suffi-
ciently definite. Nobody could tell whether he was a criminal
or not until he obtained the opinion of some subsequent court or
jury as to whether his charges had been' too high, or his
methods too vigorous. The Supreme Court, by giving the
more literal construction to the present statute, avoided this
particular objection.
The decision, however, was at once given a very extreme
construction by the business world, and raised a storm of fear
and indignation out of which sprang a new constitutional objec-
tion, first formulated by Mr. W. D. Guthrie in a paper after-
4 In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 60o.
5 U. S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association; 166 U. S. 29o.
6 Including Judge John F. Dillon.
7 See argument of Lyman Trumbull, 158 U. S. at pP. 575-7, and opinion
of 1Mr. Justice Brewer at pp. 594-6.
8 Tozer v. U. S., 52 Fed. Rep. 917, 919, per Mr. Justice Brewer; but see
the statute enforced without question in People v. Sheldon, 139 N. Y. 251, 261.
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wards published in The Harvard Law Review.9 His objection
was not presented to the court upon the then pending petition
for re-hearing in the Trans-Missouri case, but it has been most
strenuously and ably urged upon the court in the three cases
which were recently argued at its bar and are now in process of
decision.10
This objection is based upon the Fifth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution, which provides that no person shall "be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."
It is claimed that one of the rights coming under the head of
liberty or property is the right to make contracts; that a general
'freedom of contract is, therefore, guaranteed by this amend-
ment; that reasonable restraints of trade have been permitted
since before the framing of the constitution; and that no reason-
able restraints can therefore be prohibited by legislation-the
court or jury to be the judge whether or not any given restraint
is reasonable.
Mr. Guthrie and his followers largely rely upon the dictum of
Mr. Justice Peckham in a recent case to the effect that the word
"liberty" as used in the Fourteenth Amendment includes the
right of every citizen "to earn his livelihood by any lawful call-
ing; to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose
to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary and
essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the pur-
poses above mentioned.""
This phraseology, however, is not to be taken too literally.
The same supposed principle was recently invoked by a pension
attorney who was being tried for the crime of charging more
than $io for services in preparing a pension claim. Mr. Justice
Brewer overruled the objection and said: "It is within the
undoubted power of government to restrain some individuals
from all contracts, as well as all individuals from some contracts.
It * * * may restrain all engaged in any employment from
any contract in the course of that employment which is against
public policy. The possession of this power by government in
no manner conflicts with the proposition that, generally speak-
ing, every citizen has a right freely to contract for the price of
9 i Harv. Law Rev. 8o.
30 U. S. v. Joint Traffic Association, Anderson v. U. S., and Hopkins v.
U. S., argued Feb. 23-25, 1898. The first of these cases is reported below at
76 Fed. Rep. 895. The two latter relate to 'live stock exchanges at Kansas
City, one of them being reported below at 82 Fed. Rep. 529.
11 Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 589.
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his labor, services or property." 12 The statutes of every State
are full of restraints upon liberty of contract, as may be seen
by referring to the factory laws, the banking and insurance
laws, and so many other familiar branches of municipal legisla-
tion.
Is there any general legislative power to prohibit reasonable
restraints upon trade? Counsel in these cases seem to assume
that if the power exists in the Federal legislature with respect to
interstate and foreign commerce, it exists also in the State leg-
islatures with respect to all the avocations of life. They say of
the Trans-Missouri case, "The extent to which this limits the
freedom and destroys the property of the individual can scarcely
be exaggerated. For it needs no argument to show that con-
tracts and combinations which are most ordinary and indispen-
sable have the effect of restraining trade. As examples may be
suggested all organizations of mechanics engaged in the same
business for the purpose of limiting the number of persons
employed in the business, or of maintaining wages; the forma-
tion of a corporation to carry on any particular line of business
by those already engaged therein; a contract of partnership or
of employment between two persons previously engaged in the
same line of business; the appointment by two producers of the
same person to sell their goods on commission; the purchase by
one wholesale merchant of the product of two producers; the
lease or purchase by a farmer, manufacturer or merchant of an
additional farm, manufactory or shop; the withdrawal from
business of any farmer, merchant or manufacturer; a sale of the
good-will of a business with an agreement not to destroy its
value by engaging in similar business; a covenant in a deed
restricting the use of real estate. The effect of most business
contracts or combinations is to restrain trade in some degree.
The precise purpose of the present statute as now construed is to
deprive the citizen of the rights which these overwhelming
authorities hold that he possesses in this regard."1
3
It will be noticed that under the ruling in the Sugar Trust
case some of the examplesjust put do not relate to interstate or
foreign commerce at all, while others do not come within the
common law definition of a "contract in restraint of trade" -a
definition which never included the formation of a partnership
12 Frisbie v,. U. S., 157 U. S. 16o, 165; and see Holden v. Hardy, I69 U. S.
at pp. 391-3.
13 Brief of Messrs. Robert W. DeForest and David Willcox in U. S. v.
Joint Traffic Association,
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or corporation. Still, it is a serious matter for the business
community if legislatures are to exercise a power which would
so seriously interfere with the salability of the good-will of a
business, and would make so dangerous the confiding of business
secrets to an employee, as this claimed power to make criminal,
whether at common law valid or invalid, every covenant which
the common law would have considered as "in restraint of
trade. "
Perhaps we may expect from the Supreme Court, in the cases
now pending, some interesting discussion of the above-quoted
awful examples. I do not think, however, that such a discussion
will be necessary to the decision of these or any other cases
which have so far been prosecuted under the Federal Anti-
Trust Law: for, first, it is an open question, not now involved,
whether the law applies to a restraint of trade which is not the
main object of the contract in which it is found, but is merely
incidental to the effectuation of some other and lawful object;
and, second, the power of Congress over interstate commerce
may be much greater than that of any legislative body over the
ordinary avocations of life.1 4 In the cases now pending the
restraint upon trade is not merely ancillary to a sale, lease,
employment or other ordinary business transaction, but is the
main object of the combination. The Joint Traffic Association
is what is called a "traffic pool," being an agreement among
the great eastern trunk lines of railway for a division of the
traffic among themselves, so as to avoid any competition; and
its articles also provide, as in the Trans-Missouri case, for the
establishment of minimum rates. The two Kansas City live
stock exchanges, if the charges against them be true, are com-
binations of dealers for the purpose of monopolizing a certain
branch of business and conducting it at rates not below a fixed
standard.
Now, in the first place, it is still very doubtful whether the
Anti-Trust law will be held by the Supreme Court to apply
when the restraint of trade is merely ancillary, and in aid of the
14 In the Joint Traffic Association case there is the additional reason that
the defendants are quasi public agents, over whom the law therefore keeps
especially close supervision. Whether or not the law can forbid a partnership
in an ordinary business, it can certainly forbid the combination of two parallel
and competing railroads (Pearsall v,. Great Northern Ry. Co., 16i U. S. 646,
7i4; see also State v. Vanderbilt, 37 Oh. St. 590, 595; and, as to other indus-
tries in which the public has a special interest, Gibbs v. Baltimore Gas Co.,
130 U. S. 396; Gamewell Fire Alarm Co. v. Crane, 16o Mass. 5o; Cast Iron
Pipe Trust case, 85 Fed. Rep. at p. 291).
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main purpose of a sale of good will, the employment of a confi-
dential agent, or some other contract for a legal purpose. Stat-
utes in derogation of the common law, especially if they are
penal in character, are strictly construed, and from the history
of the time we know that the great combinations primarily
intended to restrain competition were the objects aimed at, as is
indicated by the use of the words "combination" and "con-
spiracy." Attorney-General Harmon pointed out the distinction
in his argument of the Trans-Missouri case, 15 and the court care-
fully reserved its opinion as to these minor restraints. 1
6 The ques-
tion is assumed to be still an open one in the Cast Iron Pipe Trust
opinion, in which Mr. Justice Harlan of the Supreme Court
(one of the majority of the court in the Trans-Missouri case)
concurred. Judge Taft, in that opinion-which probably con-
tains the most complete judicial discussion of the authorities
upon contracts in restraint of trade-shows that by the great
weight of authority combinations whose main object was to
restrain some branch of trade, or wholly or partially monopo-
lize it, have always been invalid at common law; that the par-
tial and reasonable restraints which were valid at common law,
and are perhaps still valid in interstate and foreign commerce
under this statute, are those which are merely incidental to a
sale of property or business, to the formation or dissolution of a
partnership, or to the employment of an assistant, servant or
agent; the restraints being such as are reasonable and neces-
sary to carry out the purposes of the sale or partnership agree-
ment, or to protect the employer from unjust use of the confi-
dential knowledge acquired in his business by the employee.
In the second place, assuming that Congress has the power
to prohibit all combinations in restraint of interstate or foreign
commerce, however reasonable the purpose and effect of such
combinations may be considered by the court§, does it neces-
sarily follow that the State legislatures have the power to inter-
fere similarly with all the avocations of life? I think not.
Congress is acting under an express power-the power "to regu-
late commerce with foreign nations and among the several
States and with the Indian tribes." The power acknowledges
"no limitations other than those prescribed in the constitution. "1
The limitation here appealed to is found in the words "due
15 His brief upon this point is to be found at 6 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 311-2,
314-6.
16 i66 U. S., at p. 329.
17 Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. ioo, io8.
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS.
process of law." These words conserve those personal rights
which were regarded as sacred at the time of the adoption of
the Constitution.18 Congress cannot interfere with external
commerce where, if at all, interference of the same nature was
regarded in r787 as a violation of liberty or property; but its
power over interstate commerce is the same as its power over
foreign commerce; it inherited the powers of sovereignty over the
latter, and these powers of sovereignty were very wide indeed.
It is hard to realize at the present time that Congress under
the Constitution has the abstract right to prohibit interstate
commerce altogether. That its powers in this respect are pre-
cisely the same as over foreign commerce has been frequently
recognized by the Supreme Court.19 The commercial relations
of the States in 1787 were, in fact, those of foreign nations. In
surrendering these powers to Congress, no special reservation
was made in favor of the trade between the States, and that it
has remained so free has been due to the wisdom of the legisla-
ture, not to its impotence. In very recent times, however,
Congress has asserted its right altogether to prohibit interstate
commerce in articles which previously had been allowed free
transit through the country so long as they did not make use of
the United States mails. 20 In the exercise of a similar power
over the foreign and Indian trade Congress has altogether ex-
cluded certain articles therefrom21 and, by an act almost con-
temporaneous with the Constitution, confined the latter to per-
sons holding special licenses.22 The latest instance of exclusion
is the recent act prohibiting the importation of certain sealskins.238
The registry and enrollment acts are full of severe restrictions
upon commerce by sea. One of the earliest acts, for instance,
prohibited dutiable importations in vessels of less than thirty
tons burthen.24
18 Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Imp. Co., IS How., 272, 276-7;
Hurtado v. California, nio U. S. 516, 535-6.
19 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. i, 228; License Cases, 5 How. 504, 578;
Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622-630; Bowman v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co.,
125 U. S. 465, 482; Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47, 58; Pittsburg Co. v,.
Bates, r56 U. S. 577, 587; 2 Story on the Constitution, zo65.
20 Anti-Lottery Act of March 2, 1895, C. i9i; Obscene Literature Act of
February 8, 1897, c. 172; see, also, the severe restrictions of the Interstate Com-
merce Act and other legislation referred to by Mr. Justice Brewer in the
Debs case, I58 U. S. at p. 580.
21 United States v. Holliday, 3 Wall. 407. 416-18.
22 i Stat. 329.
23 Act of December 29, 1897, Sec. 9.
24 x Stat. 48.
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In former times Congress has gone even further in the regu-
lation of foreign commerce, and has stopped it altogether. The
embargo was a familiar measure in the legislation of the various
States prior to 1787. One State at lea'st recognized it in its con-
stitution, another in its general customs administration law. It
was used as a weapon against famine, as well as for war pur-
poses.25 Their example was followed by the framers of the Con-
stitution, and without questioning their own constitutional right
to do it, in the embargo of i794.2 Embargoes and non-inter-
course acts were thereafter passed from time to time until the
war of i8r2.27 They were enforced without constitutional ques-
tion by many decisions of the Supreme Court,2s and their consti-
tutionality was referred to by Marshall and Story as an estab-
lished fact.2 9 If Congress can lay an embargo upon all foreign
commerce, can it not regulate the manner in which such com-
merce is to be managed, even to the extent of prohibiting the
individuals engaged therein from pooling the traffic or agreeing
with each other upon the scale of charges?
Probably any contemporary statesman who was asked how
Congress was liable to exercise its power of regulating external
commerce, would, like John Adams, have first suggested either
absolute prohibition or high duties, 30 and if asked how it was to
be regulated if it should be permitted to exist at all, would
probably have entered into a discussion of the question whether
Congress should allow it to be prosecuted under special
licenses, 81 or should make it free to all citizens. The regula-
tion of foreign commerce at that time was so peculiarly a
25 First Constitution of Maryland, 33; 9 Hening's Va. Statutes (1778), p.
530; I id. (1783), p. 259.
26 Joint resolution of March 26, 1794, I Stat. 400; Act of June 4, 1794. id.
372. The only constitutional objection made was that the act would be an in-
fringement on the right of the Executive, as negotiations for a treaty were
pending. The answer was "that the Legislature have solely a right to regu-
late commerce; that this measure is strictly within the constitutional duty of
the Legislature." Madison, Macon, and the strict constructionists voted for
it (Annals of Congress, April is, 1794, pp. 6oo-1.)
-27 A list of these is to be found at 5 Stat. 826, 829, 846.
28 A digest of these is to be found at 2 Stat. 451-2. "
29 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 192-3; 2 Story on the Constitution, Secs.
1264, 1289, 1290.
30 Letter to Jay, 8 Life and Works, 282-3.
31 The system of licenses for Indian trade has already been alluded to.
Licenses were in early days a common feature of the British foreign trade
(Leone Levi, History of British Commerce, 2d ed. p. iog). They were granted
by the State authorities during the revolutionary embargoes (N. Y. Act of
March 15, 1781, c. 29; 9 Hening's Va. Statutes, I77S, p. 532).
COATS TITUTIONA4L QUESTIONS.
perquisite of sovereignty that it was common among European
nations to grant to some single corporation the sole right to
trade with a given region of the world. Thus the Dutch, Eng-
lish, French, Swedes and Danes all had companies exercising
exclusive rights of trade with the East Indies, while England
had given to various companies similar exclusive rights of trade
with Turkey, Africa, the South Sea and Hudson's Bay.32 The
British East India Company continued to have a monopoly of
the Chinese trade until 1833, while individual merchants had to
get licenses in order to trade with Ceylon, Java or with the
neighboring Archipelago.83 The early congresses, like their
successors, wisely refrained from granting similar monopolies;
but they would have been astonished at the suggestion that they
had no right to prohibit combinations aimed at the establish-
ment of practical monopolies without the permission of the
nation.
It is easy to see what serious conflicts are in danger of arising
if the Federal courts shall undertake to exercise the quasi-legis-
lative powers which are claimed to exist. Counsel of.ten speak
of Courts-especially to their faces-as if they carried in their
breasts consummate wisdom, while legislators are mere canaille,
to be held under strict control. However far this may be true,
it is at least a fair statement to say that the courts are apt to be
more conservative than the legislators, and to represent the
educated sentiment of a generation back rather than that of the
present day. The decisions now relied upon by counsel as evi-
dencing the length to which a court should go in reviewing the
legislative judgment include some which are opposed to the
views seriously held by at least a considerable portion of the
thinking community. I may instance the decisions which annul
laws restricting the hours of labor for women, prohibiting pay-
ment of employees in store orders, prohibiting employees from
waiving damages for future personal injuries suffered in the
course of employment, and requiring railroads to keep flagmen
at crossings which legislators regarded as dangerous, but which
the court regarded as safe.Y No branch of the law has shown
more continual change in judicial opinion, keeping pace with
public opinion, than that which deals with restraints upon trade
by contract, and with restraints upon contracts in restraint of trade
32 Leone Levi, p. 3o; Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, Book IV., ch. I.
33 Leone Levi, pp. 235-6.
34 Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98, io8; Godeharles v. Wigeman, 1i3 Pa. St.
431; Shaver v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 7 Fed. Rep. 931; Toledo Co. v.
Jacksonville, 67 Ill. 37.
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by legislation. Contracts which were held void by one genera-
tion are held valid by the next, perhaps to become void again
with the next stage of industrial development. Nor does any
branch of the law show more diversity of judicial opinion. The
decision just cited upon hours of labor, though very recent and
carefully considered, seems to have been in effect overruled by
the United States Supreme Court.35
The advanced position now taken by the corporation lawyers
concerning the legislative power to limit the right of the indi-
vidual to make contracts regarding his own affairs, has been
clearly and frankly stated as follows: "That right can be lim-
ited only so far as may be requisite for the security and welfare
of society." 86 It is claimed that the courts are the final judges
whether any given law is requisite for this purpose. Such a test
would give the courts almost, if not quite, complete revisory
power over legislation. Its logical sequence would be a consti-
tutional amendment insuring that the courts should keep in
touch with the progress of public opinion by the election of
judges for short terms; or, as under the old New York Consti-
tution, by putting the final judicial appeal into the control of a
legislative body.
However wise the courts may be, and however foolish the
voters and their representatives, the wisdom of continual
appeals to the judiciary, based upon maxims in the Bill of
Rights, has been questioned by great judges who are no be-
lievers in the modern developments of socialistic legislation. In
the words of Mr. Justice Brewer:87 "It may be true, as con-
tended-and, not disturbed by the common hue and cry about
monopoly, I am disposed to believe that it is true-that the
real interests of the public are subserved by the consolidation of
the various transportation systems, and that the putting into
the hands and under the control of one corporation the tele-
graphic business of the country would secure to the public
cheaper and better service. But, like the other, this is no
question for the courts. This is a government of the people.
They express their will through legislative action. It would
disarrange our system of government, and would be freighted
with peril, if the courts attempted to interpose their opinions
upon matters of policy, to stay or thwart such constitutionally
expressed judgment." Edward B. Whiitney.
NEW YORK CITY, April ist, 1898.
35 Holden v. Hardy, z69 U. S. 366.
36 Brief of Messrs. DeForest and Willcox.
37 U. S. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 5o Fed. Rep. 28, 92.
